Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience

Fairness decisions often integrate affective responses within a social context, yet emotion regulation in this literature has been largely studied as a self-directed process rather than an interpersonal one. We examined how individual differences in other-directed emotion regulation--measured with the Emotion Regulation of Others and Self (EROS) scale--relate to behavioral and neural responses during fairness decisions in 138 adults completing a variant of the Ultimatum Game with human and computer partners during fMRI. Behaviorally, participants who more strongly endorsed worsening others emotions rejected unfair offers more frequently, and this tendency interacted with offer fairness to amplify rejection of unfair offers. At the neural level, the left anterior insula tracked offer unfairness more strongly in social versus nonsocial contexts, consistent with sociality modulating the neural encoding of fairness. Right dlPFC activation during socially unfair offers was greater among individuals who preferred to improve others emotions. Connectivity analyses revealed that social fairness sensitivity predicted stronger amygdala-orbitofrontal and amygdala-dmPFC coupling; the latter was further amplified among individuals higher in other-directed emotion worsening. Together, these findings identify interpersonal emotion regulation as an understudied source of variation in the affective and prefrontal systems supporting fairness-based social decisions.

Trust and fairness sustain cooperation, but social neuroscience has largely studied violations of these social norms in isolation. We asked whether neural sensitivity to betrayal carries forward into the evaluation of unfairness in a separate social exchange. In 132 adults who completed fMRI during the Trust Game and Ultimatum Game, betrayal and unfairness both recruited overlapping voxels within left anterior insula. Yet, individual differences in regional activation were uncorrelated across tasks, arguing against a simple shared-response account. Instead, cross-task structure emerged in connectivity: stronger anterior insula responses to social versus nonsocial betrayal predicted weaker anterior insula-ventromedial prefrontal coupling during social versus nonsocial fairness evaluation. These findings suggest that betrayal and unfairness are linked less by identical regional responses than by how salience signals engage valuation circuitry across contexts. By bridging two canonical social exchange tasks within the same individuals, this study reveals a network-level architecture for generalizing sensitivity to interpersonal norm violations.

As avatars become more commonplace, understanding how the brain processes emotional expressions in virtual faces is critical. We compared behavioral and neural responses to real and virtual faces expressing seven emotions (anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, surprise, neutral). In Experiment 1 (n=61), participants rated the similarity between paired faces. Expressions conveying the same emotion were rated as highly similar across face types, whereas mismatched emotions yielded substantially lower similarity ratings, indicating perceived emotional meaning was preserved despite differences in face realism. In Experiment 2 (n=91), functional near-infrared spectroscopy was used to measure brain activity while participants viewed the same stimuli. General-linear-model analyses revealed greater activation limited to visual areas for 1) virtual faces and 2) surprise and neutral expressions. Functional connectivity analyses, however, revealed network level differences between face type and emotion across the brain. Real faces elicited stronger connectivity patterns across frontal, central-temporal, and parietal regions, whereas high-arousal emotions (fear, anger, and joy) were associated with broader network engagement than other expressions. Our results suggest face-type processing occur in early visual areas, and despite perceptual similarity, different emotions on real and virtual faces are associated with distinct patterns of network level connectivity across the brain.

Updating impressions of others is essential to navigating social life. As we get to know an individual, we update our impressions of them in accordance with new information. How the brain dynamically revises impressions in real time under naturalistic conditions remains unclear. Here, we address this question using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and natural language analysis in a naturalistic social cognition paradigm. Across 10 runs, participants viewed a character-driven TV episode, reported moments of insight, and described their impressions of the characters. Results reveal that impressions progressively evolved over time. Individuals with more similar existing impressions exhibit greater neural synchrony during movie-watching, which predicts convergence in post-movie impressions. Neural synchrony in the right superior temporal sulcus (STS) mediates the influence of initial similarity on later alignment. Insight moments accompany neural pattern shifts widespread across cortical regions, including the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and STS, and the magnitude of the shifts tracks the degree of impression updating. Specifically, distinct forms of insight selectively update complementary components of impressions: character insight updates person-centered representations, whereas non-character insight shapes social-event structure. Together, these findings show that people update their impressions of others through dynamic shifts in distributed brain activity patterns at moments of insight, providing a novel and ecologically grounded neural account of social cognition. Significance statementPeople do not simply form first impressions and keep them. As we learn new things about others, our judgments change--sometimes gradually, sometimes in a flash of insight. By tracking brain activity while people watched a TV show and described how their impressions of the characters evolved, we found that people who saw a character in more similar ways also show more similar brain responses when watching them onscreen, which in turn leads to convergence in subsequent impressions. Such updating is closely tied to "aha" moments, when a person is suddenly understood in a new way. These moments were marked by rapid shifts in the brain representational patterns, and larger shifts predicted greater changes in impressions. These findings offer a more naturalistic account of how the brain revises our understanding of other people in everyday life.

Facial perception is a central feature of everyday social encounters and a rich source of emotional information. Classic functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies of emotional facial processing used static photos emotional expression to identify regions of the brain showing univariate differences in response magnitudes between different emotional categories. However, there has been much less work identifying how the brain represents dynamic emotional facial expression and the factors that drive the similarity among these representations. In the current study, incorporated dynamic facial expression stimuli and representational similarity analysis to compare three competing hypothesized models of similarity of each of the stimuli presented: action being made, valence of the expression, and the identity of the person being perceived. Participants were shown short videos of fourteen volunteer actors making positive or negative facial expressions directed either toward or away from the camera. Activation patterns were compared against competing models on a trial-by-trial basis using a full multilevel modeling approach. Results showed that the identity of the person in the video was a greater predictor of brain responses similarity than the action or valence across widely distributed brain systems, particularly in the default mode network and lower-level visual processing regions. This suggests that the specific identity of the stimulus being perceived is a central driver of neural response similarity during perceptual encoding in dynamic facial processing.

How children come to evaluate social-affective cues is shaped within the family, yet the neural expression of this process and its dependence on family relationships remain unclear. We tested whether parent-child similarity in the neural coding of affective judgment varies with family environment, and whether it relates to youth affective distress. Twenty-five parent-child dyads (youth, mean age 11.8; parents mean age 42 years) judged faces morphed along an angry-to-happy continuum as positive or negative during fMRI. For each participant, we defined an evaluative choice axis distinguishing faces judged positive from negative, independent of expression intensity. Using searchlight-based parent-child cross-decoding, we tested whether one dyad member's evaluative coding predicted the other member's judgments, indexing shared evaluative coding rather than shared sensitivity to expression intensity. Inference focused a priori on medial prefrontal cortex. There was no reliable average parent-child neural similarity across the sample. Instead, higher family conflict was associated with lower parent-child neural similarity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). Demonstrating specificity to negative relational strain, this effect was not observed for complementary dimensions of family cohesion or identity. Moreover, the effect was specific to true dyads rather than random pairings and to vmPFC rather than a face-selective network or other medial prefrontal regions. Lower vmPFC similarity showed a preliminary association with higher youth affective distress. These findings indicate that affective valuation, rather than sensory encoding, may be a representational level at which perceived family conflict is reflected in parent-child neural similarity.

Ostracism (i.e., social exclusion) threatens social security and individuals who are hypersensitive to it may face long-term negative mental health consequences. Clarifying how self-reported distress and neural responses to ostracism unfold moment-by-moment and across varying levels of individual traits may help better understand what contributes to hypersensitivity. To this objective, the current study employed a functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) adapted Cyberball task and single-trial analytic techniques in a sample of 53 college students (aged 18-22 years). Results confirmed that Cyberball induced ostracism increased self-reported distress and neural activity in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC), a region associated with emotion regulation. Self-reported distress varied with differences in social anxiety and need for belonging. Moreover, vlPFC activity sensitized across exclusion-specific trials and this neural sensitization was differentially modulated by social anxiety, need for belonging, and personality growth mindset. The current study highlights the value of single-trial approaches for capturing the nuanced temporal dynamics of ostracism responses. Additionally, it underscores the importance of examining how individual differences shape immediate responses to ostracism to better understand their association with downstream, longer-term consequences.

Recent work, including the third visual stream hypothesis, frames social perception as a largely automatic visual process. Simple animations of shapes engaged in "social" behaviors such as chasing have long been used to study social perception; however, both behavioral and neural responses are typically modeled against discrete, experimenter-assigned stimulus labels. This approach is insufficient, given that perceptions of such stimuli vary not only between people but also across trials. Here, we directly compared the neural responses to objective (stimulus-based) and subjective (response-based) socialness in an fMRI study in which the degree of chase between two agents was varied algorithmically. Participants (n=24) rated their perception of a chase on a continuous scale. Subjective ratings better predicted activity in visuo-social brain regions, predominantly in area MT, even after controlling for optic flow. Our findings underscore the visual nature of social cognition and highlight the importance of analyses sensitive to idiosyncrasies in perception.

Nonduality is a foundational but conceptually elusive notion across several contemplative traditions. Nondual traditions challenge the assumption that a subject-object structure characteristic of ordinary experience is an intrinsic feature of conscious awareness. However, little remains known about the neurocognitive mechanisms associated with such experiential state. Here, we investigated how Open Presence (OP) meditation, a form of non-dual mindfulness practice, modulates bodily self-representation and large-scale brain functional organization. We combined the Full-Body Illusion Experience (FBIE), a virtual reality paradigm manipulating bodily self-processing, with resting-state functional connectivity gradient analyses in expert meditators (>10,000 hours of practice) and meditation novices. We hypothesized that OP would attenuate bodily self susceptibility as measured by FBIE and increase large-scale integration of functional brain networks, consistent with prior findings linking reduced self-boundaries and ego-dissolution to increased connectome integration. Seventy-five participants (28 experts, 47 novices) underwent fMRI scanning during OP meditation. Brain network organization was assessed using connectivity gradients and network dispersion/ eccentricity metrics. Group differences were evaluated using bootstrap statistics and support vector classification. Compared with novices, expert practitioners showed reduced global network eccentricity during OP, particularly within dorsal attention, ventral attention, and frontoparietal networks, suggesting greater large-scale integration of functional networks. These neural patterns were positively correlated with FBIE self-report measures and negatively with cognitive defusion scores, a construct thought to reflect reduced self-grasping toward thoughts and mental contents. Together, these findings suggest that nondual meditation is associated with alterations in self-representation and increased large-scale functional integration, providing candidate neural markers of nondual awareness.

Hedonic valence, the intrinsic pleasantness or unpleasantness of an experience, is fundamental to human psychological functioning. Yet, how valence is represented in the brain remains an open question. Functional MRI studies have demonstrated that the brain encodes both positive and negative valence, but this evidence largely stems from experiments using simplified, controlled stimuli, such as images, sounds, or words. As a result, it remains unclear how valence is processed during rich, naturalistic experiences that more closely reflect real life. In addition, most studies adopt a single statistical model, raising concerns about the robustness of their findings. This study used a formal voxel-wise Bayesian model selection approach to test alternative statistical models supporting Bipo-larity, Valence-General, and Bivalence hypotheses to identify the most optimal model of valence representation during narrative listening. Our results provide evidence for the Bipolar model. We identified distributed brain re-gions that selectively encode valence as a bipolar continuum (negative to positive) during narrative comprehen-sion, including classical emotion-related hubs such as ventromedial prefrontal cortex, as well as regions not tradi-tionally associated with emotion processing, such as inferior occipital cortex, supramarginal cortex, inferior frontal cortex, and middle cingulate. Regions selectively encoding arousal and those broadly responsive to both valence and arousal were also identified. These findings highlight the importance of using formal model comparison and naturalistic paradigms in affective neuroscience, advancing our understanding of how valence is represented in the brain during real-world experiences.

Awe is a positive emotion often accompanied by sensations of vastness and unity, with known benefits for well-being and social behavior. However, its neural underpinnings remain poorly understood. We recorded electroencephalography (EEG) and autonomic physiology in 23 healthy older participants while they watched a nature-based audiovisual film and subjectively rated awe events. Awe was the predominant emotion reported - though other positive emotions (e.g., joy) were also highly rated. Awe events were associated with decreased skin conductance level (SCL), and decreased EEG alpha and theta spectral power - physiological changes associated with low arousal and positively valenced emotional states. Interestingly, awe events exhibited increased Lempel Ziv Complexity (LZC) - indicating heightened neural signal entropy and increased richness of the conscious experience. LZC was also positively associated with the intensity of the awe ratings and negatively associated with SCL. Three additional datasets with separate independent induction methods (video clips and pharmacological induction via N,N-dimethyltryptamine) also showed positive occipital LZC associations with awe - suggesting some generalizability of LZC as a neurophysiological marker of awe. These results suggest that awe evokes neurophysiological states linked to the subjective affective experience. Impact StatementAwe, an emotion of increasing interest, has been studied with fMRI and peripheral physiology - but few studies have used electroencephalography (EEG). In this EEG study, we utilize a movie-watching paradigm to explore potential physiological correlates of awe. The results present EEG-based complexity increases as a potential correlate of awe, though showing limited generalization to independent datasets and limited uniqueness compared to joy, another positive emotion.

In task-oriented teams, long-term coordination among specialized roles may contribute to shared patterns of cognition and behavior, yet little is known about how such experience is reflected in brain functional organization. Here, we examined whether cross-individual differences in whole-brain functional connectivity were associated with court position and team membership in professional volleyball players. In the resting-state and naturalistic volleyball game-viewing conditions, we analyzed dyadic functional connectivity differences to test whether effects of shared position and team were evident across intrinsic and contextually engaged brain states, controlling for differences in playing time and performance-related statistics. We found that same-position players showed smaller functional connectivity differences. These effects were most prominent and widespread across brain networks during game viewing, whereas at rest they were specific to the somatomotor network. Team membership was also associated with smaller functional connectivity differences during game viewing, although position x team interactions varied across networks after covariate adjustment. A complementary machine learning classifier further showed that shared position could be predicted from intersubject differences in functional connectivity with accuracy exceeding a frequency-based baseline. Together, these findings suggest that shared role-specific and team-based experience may contribute to structured similarity in functional brain organization within a real-world team setting.

People navigate dozens of social interactions daily. Through these, they construct and maintain diverse social networks. While personal dispositions drive how people interact and connect others, the resulting networks feed back into daily social experiences by creating interaction opportunities and modulating cognitive processes. Here, we show that people's moment-to-moment interaction behaviors are informative of the structure of their personal social network, even if the interaction occurs between strangers. We paired 104 strangers to perform an interactive motor task and investigated whether emergent leader-follower roles and spontaneous movement synchronization reflected similarities or differences in their personal networks. Participants with tighter networks (smaller, denser, more constrained, and with fewer communities) relative to the interaction partner adapted their movements to the partner more. Using multivariate temporal response functions (mTRF) to measure neural encoding of self and other's movements, we found that, conversely, participants with less tight networks exhibited higher neural encoding of their partner's movements. This suggests that the network effect on behavioral adaptation was unlikely to be driven by heightened monitoring of the partner. Higher spontaneous movement synchronization was associated with higher personality agreeableness and personality similarity between interacting partners. Our results demonstrate that signatures of personal social environment manifest dynamically in real-time behaviors and that these effects are independent of personality effects. Thus, social networks set an additional context for interpersonal interaction even for partners without a prior relationship.

Mind Blanking (MB) is a mental state characterized by the experience of a seemingly empty mind. This apparent emptiness challenges the theoretical view of a continuous and content-full stream of thought, leading to the question of how it is possible to capture MB events in the first place. MB research has relied largely on probe-caught experience-sampling, during which participants are interrupted at random times to report their mental state. This approach risks missing some MB events as they may occur between probes. Self-caught paradigms, on the other hand, allow participants to report MB upon spontaneously realizing it, relying on meta-awareness. To date, it is not clear whether these two methods capture the same phenomenon neuronally. Here, we investigated whether probe-caught MB (pMB) and self-caught MB (sMB) converge on their behavioral properties and brain correlates. Twenty-two participants underwent 3T fMRI scanning while performing both a pMB and a sMB experience-sampling task. We compared the behavioral properties, BOLD activations and time-varying functional connectivity (FC) across the two approaches. We found that reporting frequencies of pMB and sMB were significantly correlated across individuals, and both MB reports were uniformly distributed over time, pointing towards a behavioral convergence across approaches. However, we observed a divergence in BOLD activations, as sMB recruited significantly greater activation in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) compared to pMB, likely reflecting the meta-awareness and metacognitive monitoring required for self-detecting a MB. Lastly, time-varying FC analysis revealed a convergence, with both pMB and sMB FC resembling a hyperconnectivity pattern compared to other content-full mental states, pointing towards low arousal FC. Together, our results show that sMB and pMB converge on overlapping neurobehavioral correlates. This positions the self-caught method as a complementary tool for studying MB without external interruption, while highlighting the role of meta-awareness in self-report detection.

AO_SCPLOWBSTRACTC_SCPLOWSustained affect shapes well-being, yet its neural architecture across externally elicited and internally generated experience remains unclear. Using whole-brain functional connectivity during minutes-long naturalistic movie viewing, we derived positive and negative affective experience signatures and their underlying neural architecture. These signatures predicted valence-specific affective intensity and generalized to independent movie-viewing data and internally generated affect, discriminating sad memory and rumination from neutral distraction while tracking subjective experience. Importantly, their expression showed little relation to vigilance or cognitive demand. Characterization of these signatures revealed coherent community structure and a shared distributed backbone, alongside valence-preferential components, consistent with a partially separable architecture. Extending beyond experimentally evoked states, in four resting-state depression cohorts, these signatures distinguished patients from controls with reduced positive and elevated negative signature expression, and predicted symptom burden and anhedonia. These findings identify a generalizable distributed architecture bridging external and internal affective experience and extending to clinically relevant affective dysregulation.

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is widely used to map brain systems that process affective stimuli and predict concurrent affective experiences in the scanner. However, the extent to which affect-related fMRI activity in the scanner predicts affective experiences in daily life remains unclear. This study examined whether a multivariate brain pattern previously validated to predict negative affect to emotional images during fMRI testing (the Picture-Induced Negative Emotion Signature; PINES) associates with daily negative affect measured over 7-10 days via daily diaries and ecological momentary assessment. Among 287 midlife adults, those exhibiting greater PINES pattern expression showed greater daily (end-of-day) and hourly negative affect. These findings were not explained by demographic factors and trait negative affect. A cross-validated whole-brain pattern of negative affect generalizes beyond the fMRI testing context to predict negative affect severity in daily life.

Empathy enables individuals to attune to others' experiences through shared affective, sensorimotor, and neural representations, but its influence on higher-level decision-making and social alignment remains unknown. We examined whether empathy promotes social conformity and whether this effect depends on physiological arousal, visual attention, and socio-emotional traits. Seventy-three participants completed an empathy-for-pain task followed by a modified random-dot task in which they interacted with previously seen empathy targets, while physiological signals and eye movements were recorded. Drift-diffusion modeling showed that feedback from empathy targets increased conformity, reflected in stronger decision bias toward targets, faster evidence accumulation, and reduced decision conservatism. Visual attention to the eyes or mouth was linked to greater conformity depending on the context. Heart rate variability was unrelated to conformity, whereas phasic skin conductance was associated with smaller bias changes and greater conservatism. Alexithymia and autistic traits further shaped the empathy-conformity relationships. These findings suggest that empathic shared representation extends beyond affective resonance to influence social alignment in decision-making.

Empathy, a key element of social interaction, involves both cognitive and affective processes and is commonly investigated through measures such as empathic accuracy and affective physiological synchrony. While physiological synchrony offers a continuous measure of affective processes, empathic accuracy typically relies on discrete self-reports, leaving their temporal relationship largely unexplored. Advancing this line of research requires datasets that integrate time-continuous self-reports with physiological signals, yet such datasets--particularly those focusing on the empathizee--remain limited. To fill this gap, we present EMPAC (Empathy Measurement: Physiological, Affective, and Cognitive), a multimodal dataset constructed. To create empathy-eliciting stimuli, professional actors performed emotionally intense, pseudo-autobiographical narratives while their physiological signals (e.g., ECG, EDA) and continuous self-reported emotional states were recorded. We then conducted two observer experiments using these video recordings. In Experiment 1, to validate the stimuli as empathy-eliciting materials, observers continuously rated emotional intensity without being informed of the specific emotion portrayed, following the protocol of previous studies on time-series empathic accuracy. Yet this approach sometimes revealed a gap between the emotion category portrayed by the target and that perceived by the observers. In Experiment 2, we introduced a revised procedure in which the target emotion category was disclosed prior to viewing, revealing that specifying the target emotion led to a different relationship between individual empathy traits and empathic accuracy than observed in Experiment 1. EMPAC thus provides a rich, temporally aligned resource for investigating empathy dynamics in naturalistic settings and for evaluating methodological variations in empathic accuracy paradigms.

What does the brain do during the continuous, varied experience of watching a story unfold? One account holds that the brain traverses a finite repertoire of recurring states, but whether that repertoire is a stable property of the individual or is reshaped by each new experience has not been tested across diverse naturalistic content within the same person. We characterized the dynamic brain-state repertoire in six individuals who watched the television series Friends across its six seasons during fMRI (up to [~]146 episodes, [~]54 hours per person). For each individual we fit a sticky hierarchical Dirichlet process hidden Markov model across all episodes, discovering brain states (recurring whole-brain activity patterns with characteristic coupling) without pre-specifying their number. Each individuals brain visited roughly forty-five states arrayed along a continuous recurrence gradient, from states active in nearly every episode to episode-specific ones, with no sharp division between them. The repertoire was heterogeneous in why its states recurred: a minority locked to scan-run structure, the majority remaining eligible for content. Transitions were organized by the functional-connectivity similarity between states (per-individual Spearman {rho} = 0.33-0.55) and, in most individuals, respected resting-state network boundaries. Episode content was associated with which states the brain occupied moment to moment. The recurrence ordering discovered in Friends transferred to state occupancy during other social-narrative films (five of six individuals) and attenuated as stimuli departed from that class, weakening for visual-only reading and audio-only listening. Across diverse narrative experience, the dynamic repertoire is a property of the individual: content varies which states are visited and when, not which states exist.

Empathy has been linked to facial emotion recognition, but whether empathy is associated with the structural representation of facial affect (how observers position different affects relative to one another in face-shape space) remains largely unexplored. 53 adults completed a genetic-algorithm face task that generated prototypes for 13 affects using the Basel Face Model, and completed the 60-item Empathy Quotient (EQ). The genetic-algorithm task produced structurally distinct prototypes for all 13 affects (all paired tests p < .001 Bonferroni-corrected; Cohens dz 1.74-3.13), confirming that participants generated reliable, affect-specific face representations. A 13 x 13 between-affect distance matrix was then compared between higher-EQ (n = 30) and lower-EQ (n = 23) groups. 1 pair survived full correction across all 156 off-diagonal cells: Amusement x Contempt (Cohens d = -1.31), with higher-empathy participants representing these two affects as structurally closer to each other. Both amusement and contempt are social-evaluative affects that share overlapping facial action components, and this convergence may reflect heightened sensitivity to shared expressive structure among higher-empathy observers. In exploratory analyses, permutation testing and continuous-EQ correlations pointed to a broader pattern centered on social-evaluative affects (Amusement, Awe, Contempt, Fear, Happiness, Pride, Sadness, Interest). Individual differences in empathy appear most prominently associated with how social-evaluative affects are structurally positioned in face-shape space, suggesting that empathy modulates not just emotion recognition accuracy but the representational geometry of facial affect itself.